The U.S.-Israeli war against Iran is now entering its third month. The average length of an interstate conflict in the past 200 years is three to four months, though many wars last far longer. This one shows little sign of abating.
But the war may be entering a new phase where prospects for a transformational change on the battlefield or at the negotiating table are receding. We need to adjust our frame of reference accordingly. Instead of looking for a determinative ending, a final resolution, or a negotiated agreement, this war may end up as just another round in an ongoing, half-century confrontation between the United States and Iran. Five politically inconvenient realities now define where we are.
The U.S.-Israeli war against Iran is now entering its third month. The average length of an interstate conflict in the past 200 years is three to four months, though many wars last far longer. This one shows little sign of abating.
But the war may be entering a new phase where prospects for a transformational change on the battlefield or at the negotiating table are receding. We need to adjust our frame of reference accordingly. Instead of looking for a determinative ending, a final resolution, or a negotiated agreement, this war may end up as just another round in an ongoing, half-century confrontation between the United States and Iran. Five politically inconvenient realities now define where we are.
- Indefinite impasse
Though the United States still hopes to strike a deal with Iran, the impasse that now characterizes the situation in the region could well be the new normal. Iran is inflicting pain on the United States and its allies with its closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. blockade is taking a toll on Iran. Yet neither economic warfare nor military escalation has yielded success on the battlefield or in negotiations. The Trump administration appears to have rejected Iran’s proposal to open the strait in exchange for ending the U.S. blockade, with negotiations on broader issues to follow. But it hasn’t decided on an alternative approach.
For anyone paying close attention to the trajectory of U.S.-Iranian relations over the past half-century, the cycle looks familiar: conflict, confrontation, and at times accommodation. To be sure, this round has different players, much tougher tactics, and second- and third-order economic and political consequences that eclipse previous chapters. But it’s a safe bet that this round, like its predecessors, won’t be determinative.
The regime will likely survive, albeit less coherent and more radical than before. The nuclear issue won’t be resolved, although it will take Iran time to reconstitute its program. Iran’s allies are weaker—including Hezbollah and Hamas—but have not been dismantled. The Houthis in Yemen continue to threaten shipping in the Red Sea.
What stands out today is the reality that Operation Epic Fury has left Iran weaker, angrier, and far less willing to accept any agreement that lacks definition or finality. The United States and Israel inflicted a setback rather than a defeat. They achieved significant tactical gains rather than a strategic success. It’s not exactly wash, rinse, and repeat, but the pattern is clear. The United States and Iran will both claim to have won this round—but it’s only a round. Another one will almost certainly follow.
- No good deal
None of this should come as a surprise. Because of the Islamic Republic’s nature, there are no good deals to be made with Iran, let alone transformative Hollywood endings. That’s why successive U.S. administrations have pursued more realistic political or military transactions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a flawed but highly functional accord designed to buy time, constrain Iran’s nuclear program, and put as much distance as possible between the regime and a weapon. Indeed, it made a virtue out of necessity.
The Iranian leadership constitutes a repressive, authoritarian clerical regime, marinated in the ideology of death to Israel and America. It remains determined to spread its influence via allies and proxies largely committed to the same goal. It has had no interest in transforming its relations with the United States. If anything, two months of war have hardened Iranian attitudes and strengthened the regime’s resolve to avoid any deals that could weaken its grip on power. Even a limited transaction—an improved nuclear deal, which appeared possible after President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the original accord in 2018—now seems unlikely.
- Washington lost the initiative
It’s ironic that the one transformative aspect of this war was delivered by Iran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz, not by Trump. Having leveraged the strait for political and financial gain, Iran now wants to retain that influence. As Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations observed recently, Iran isn’t going to give up control over what it now regards as its Panama Canal, either permanently or on the cheap.
That leaves the Trump administration with a number of unpalatable options: retain the blockade in the hope that Iran will bend or break; launch a major naval, ground, and air campaign to reopen the strait and maintain a permanent military presence to keep it open; or cut a narrow deal with Iran to trade opening the strait for the removal of the blockade and the possibility of negotiating broader issues later. Reuters also reported this week that the U.S. intelligence community is preparing an analysis of how Iran would process a situation in which Trump unilaterally declares victory. But we doubt that a unilateral withdrawal is likely.
What these options share is the inconvenient reality that the United States has lost the initiative; it is playing Iran’s game on Iran’s turf, and it will be forced to accept that regime change is not in the cards.
- The Netanyahu factor
Whatever impact Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had on the beginning of the war, he will not have a determinative impact on how this round ends. Yet Israel remains in a position to ensure that the U.S.-Iranian conflict will continue in some form in future rounds.
When it comes to Iran, the United States and Israel have a great deal in common. But on one issue, they’re Mars and Venus. For Israel, a nuclear Iran is an existential threat; for the United States, it isn’t. Throw in Iran’s proxies, especially Hezbollah, and you have a prescription for interminable tensions and conflict as long as this Iranian regime remains in power. When it comes to Iran, Israel in a way will be the tail wagging the dog.
At the same time, there will be limits. The credibility of Netanyahu and Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency has tanked, for this has not been the promised short war leading to the collapse of the Iranian regime. Israel’s continuing bombardment of Lebanon also will soon get on Trump’s nerves, as it adds an unwanted dimension to the conundrum he already faces domestically and globally.
- Iran’s advantage
Noted political scientist I. William Zartman theorized that conflict resolution efforts often have the best chance of success when the warring parties reach a mutually hurting stalemate—that is, when neither side can escalate to victory, the costs of continuing conflict are painfully high, and they both begin to see negotiation as a way out. It’s then and only then that a conflict may be seen as ripe for de-escalation or resolution. Right now, both the United States and Iran believe they have the upper hand, both seem stubbornly willing to continue to bear the costs, and neither side sees a way out through an agreement.
But when it comes to definitions of victory, there’s a critical asymmetry that gives Tehran the edge. Iran has suffered significant conventional military losses, and its nuclear ambitions have been set back. But its definition of victory is regime survival and newfound leverage over Hormuz. In addition to reopening the waterway, Trump’s goal is to constrain Iran’s nuclear program in a way that is somehow more conclusive than his predecessors. The U.S. definition of victory will be hard to achieve as long as the Iranian regime remains in power, however weakened.
Whether there’s a diplomatic off-ramp is not at all clear. Efforts to find common ground continue via Pakistani mediators. But gaps remain significant. Indeed, these negotiations can’t be done part time by Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, and J.D. Vance on the back of a cocktail napkin, on a call, or through intermediaries with 20-point plans. They will be long, detailed, and arduous.
This much is clear: The United States, a global power with enormous military strength, has failed to overcome a medium-size power with asymmetric political, economic, and military options. Iran has played rope-a-dope with previous U.S. administrations—and now with a president who, in the words of Carnegie’s Karim Sadjadpour, went looking for an Iranian Delcy Rodríguez but found a few Kim Jong Uns instead. So it goes with a war of choice—that an impulsive president looking for quick wins and easy results may come to wish he had never started.
