Russia’s Famed Victory Day Falls Short of Triumph

But this year the Kremlin announced ahead of the commemorations that it would scale back its display, citing concerns that Ukraine would choose this moment to send drones packed with explosives into the center of the Russian capital.

Although experts say this worry did, in all likelihood, motivate the decision, the move also raised questions about whether Russia may simply not have the gear to spare from the frontlines of eastern Ukraine as the war drags on.

“It’s a bit of both,” said Natia Seskuria, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) defense think tank in London.

Ukraine has no reason not to attempt to strike a huge reputational blow against the Kremlin on one of its most symbolic, publicized days, she told Newsweek.

But with peace talks stalled, Russia is also looking ahead to possibly years more of war and planning for the long term, rather than parading and posturing, Seskuria said.

Russian Ground Losses During Ukraine War

The more than four years of slow, grinding war has undoubtedly taken its toll on Russia, becoming incredibly expensive and deadly for Russian soldiers deployed to the frontlines. Russia’s ground forces have been the most heavily hit.

The conflict has caused more than 1.3 million Russian casualties, according to disputed Ukrainian figures.

That casualty count includes both soldiers killed and wounded, and although analysts are cautious with trusting casualty counts during wars, Ukraine’s tally has been widely cited by Western officials.

After many of Russia’s most experienced, professional soldiers were killed in the early weeks of the war, Russia quickly became notorious for throwing huge numbers of ill-equipped, little-trained volunteers, conscripts and prisoners at Ukrainian defenses to overwhelm Kyiv with sheer numbers. The macabre practice quickly became known as a “meat grinder” tactic.

On top of widely publicized problems with accurate reporting up the command chain, corruption and alcoholism, Russia is believed to have targeted its poorest regions to replenish the ranks, angling to keep the domestic impact of the war down. Combined, the professionalism and effectiveness of the Russian army has suffered, despite its extensive combat experience.

The war has also chewed up thousands of Russia’s tanks, armored vehicles and artillery systems. According to Ukraine’s numbers, Russia has lost nearly 12,000 tanks, more than 24,000 armored vehicles, well over 40,000 artillery systems.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense says Russia has lost a confirmed 4,394 main battle tanks, more than 10,000 armored vehicles and nearly 2,200 pieces of artillery.

Moscow dramatically ramped up its industrial output to backfill destroyed stocks, as well as reaching into storage and even museums to replace equipment mangled by war.

And its production lines are working. Sergey Chemezov, the head of Russia’s state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, claimed in June 2025 its military production had grown tenfold in four years, and that the company was churning out 80 percent of all equipment used by Russian forces against Ukraine.

Chemezov said Rostec’s workforce had grown by 100,000 people since 2022 and would swell by another 100,000 in the coming years.

Despite the demands of the war, Russia still had more than 3,400 main battle tanks, ranging from the decades-old T-55 models to more than 600 of its latest T-90s as of late 2025, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a London-based think tank.

Russia suffers from “equipment gaps,” particularly with armored vehicles, the IISS said. But it still has Soviet stocks to refurbish or rip up for parts, even if these remaining vehicles are in increasingly short supply, the think tank said.

Moscow has adapted and improved its industry better than expected, said Seskuria.

While upping domestic production, Russia has also leaned heavily on its allies to supplement its military.

Ukraine’s then-military intelligence chief, Kyrylo Budanov, indicated last year North Korea—which has sent an estimated 14,000 troops to southern Russia—planned to send tanks to Russia, although this has not been confirmed by Western intelligence or open-source reports from the battlefield.

U.S., Ukrainian and South Korean authorities say Russia has received missiles and ammunition from North Korea. Officials in Washington and Kyiv have also said China has sent materials that can be used to make weapons to Russia, while Beijing has denied supplying weapons to Russia.

But tactics have changed since the early weeks of the war, when Russia lost huge numbers of tanks and the experienced crews manning them.

Observers say Russia has been more heavily relying on motorbikes, quadbikes and buggies in the past two years to mount attacks on Ukrainian units, rather than risking losing tanks or armored vehicles that are vulnerable to Ukrainian drone strikes.

Soldiers on bikes or buggies, although more exposed to attacks than tank crews, can more effectively dodge drones and are a cheaper alternative for some operations, rather than risking expensive tanks already in shorter supply.

The Ukrainian military said in March it was seeing bikes and buggies used more often on the battlefield again after the tough winter months.

Different types of drones, from long-range explosive devices to ground-based robots, have also dominated tactics in Ukraine, shifting some emphasis away from traditional, heavy military equipment.

Russian Naval Losses

Ukraine’s government said roughly a third of Russia’s Black Sea naval fleet had been destroyed or seriously damaged by the start of 2026.

Ukraine sank the Moskva, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, off the coast of southern Ukraine in April 2022, as well as one of Russia’s submarines in the annexed city of Sevastopol, and multiple large landing ships, which Russia uses to ferry troops and equipment to shore during amphibious attacks.

The Black Sea Fleet, however, is just one of several fleets in the Russian Navy. While Ukraine has attacked a few of Russia’s small warships that launch long-range missiles in the Baltic Fleet, the Northern and Pacific Fleets have not been brought into the war effort.

The Northern Fleet is Russia’s most powerful, and includes submarines that carry nuclear weapons to launch strikes or retaliate in the event of an attack on Russia.

The Economic Toll

Moscow’s military spending has ballooned since February 2022,

Russia’s military spending reached around 7.5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) in 2025, or about $190 billion, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The exact numbers vary slightly, as Russia hasn’t fully disclosed its budgets for years.

As a slice of GDP, this far outpaces the just over 3 percent the U.S. dedicates to defense. However, Washington is the world’s top military spender, funneling $954 billion into defense last year.

This sustained military spending increase has warped Russia’s economy, beset by inflation and bound by Western sanctions. Other sectors of Russian society, like healthcare services, have been hit by labor shortages as doctors and nurses are recruited into the military or leave the country.

The Ukraine war has become a “huge burden for the Russian economy,” Seskuria said.

But despite this, Russia’s economy hasn’t collapsed, as some onlookers had predicted. However, although Russia clamped down on social media and internet freedoms, there are signs of growing discontent across Russian society around the juddering, painful war effort—particularly after Russian forces lost ground in Ukraine last month for the first time in nearly two years.

In April, Russia’s largest state-owned pollster said Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating had dropped more than 12 percentage points since the start of 2026, reaching its lowest point since before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Some of Russia’s military capabilities have been largely untouched or entirely unscathed. But some parts of the Russian military, like its space, cyber and nuclear forces, may be indirectly impacted by cuts to their budgets and slower maintenance schedules.

Russian Missiles

Previous Victory Day parades have put Russia’s nuclear-capable missile systems on display. The Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which can carry nuclear warheads and thought to have a range of up to 7,500 miles, has been repeatedly rolled out for May 9 celebrations since it was unveiled in 2010.

The Yars is one of several missiles forming Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, which are nuclear warheads deployed on ICBMs launched from ground-based systems or silos, plus submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and weapons fired from bomber aircraft.

They are considered weapons that would level cities in a nuclear conflict, and are more destructive than lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons.