I cut my teeth as a Middle East scholar in places such as Damascus, Syria; Ramallah in the West Bank; Ankara, Turkey; Istanbul, and Cairo. They are cities with rich histories or great political influence or both. The Persian Gulf states were always an afterthought, better left to odd-duck Europeans who spent their time studying the lineages of various tribes and clans throughout the Arabian Peninsula. To me, that kind of work was even worse than watching cricket.
But in the past decade, I have found myself in the Gulf more frequently than I had ever imagined. Don’t get me wrong, I still prefer ancient Cairo to antiseptic and over-air-conditioned Doha, Qatar. But the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—have become more interesting than ever. That is because, to different degrees, they are engaged in wide-ranging efforts to remake their economies and societies.
I cut my teeth as a Middle East scholar in places such as Damascus, Syria; Ramallah in the West Bank; Ankara, Turkey; Istanbul, and Cairo. They are cities with rich histories or great political influence or both. The Persian Gulf states were always an afterthought, better left to odd-duck Europeans who spent their time studying the lineages of various tribes and clans throughout the Arabian Peninsula. To me, that kind of work was even worse than watching cricket.
But in the past decade, I have found myself in the Gulf more frequently than I had ever imagined. Don’t get me wrong, I still prefer ancient Cairo to antiseptic and over-air-conditioned Doha, Qatar. But the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—have become more interesting than ever. That is because, to different degrees, they are engaged in wide-ranging efforts to remake their economies and societies.
As U.S. President Donald Trump highlighted during his visit to the region last May, it is fair to say that there is a Gulf model of development. Yet the U.S.-Israel war with Iran has raised serious questions about that model. If the early signs from the diplomatic maneuvering indicate anything, the Iranians may emerge with more leverage in the Strait of Hormuz than ever before. And Tehran would retain the means to menace its neighbors with missiles and drones.
The development model that the major Gulf states have pursued aims to attract a professional and investor class to places such as Dubai; Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Doha; and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as part of a broad effort at economic diversification. This includes creating centers for advanced technology, logistics, higher education, tourism, sport, and entertainment. The bases for this development are political stability and regional security. The Gulf states have the former covered. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Emirati President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani will likely rule for many years. As for security, the presence of U.S. military bases seemed to keep a lid on regional tensions.
After the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 and the war in Gaza that followed, it was possible to see two Middle Easts. The Gulf states, largely untouched by the ensuing multifront conflict, continued their particular paths of development. As Israelis whomped on Gaza, sought shelter in safe rooms from Houthi missiles, and decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership, the Gulf countries poured money into gigaprojects, attracted the world’s top tech companies, and used their own enormous sovereign wealth funds to invest in strategic (and not so strategic) industries both at home and abroad.
While other countries were fighting old fights, they were building. For Mohammed bin Salman, Mohammed bin Zayed, and Emir Tamim, conflicts in other parts of the Middle East would not hold back their development plans.
When Israel and the United States attacked Iran in June 2025, The Gulf states came out of the 12-day war relatively unscathed. The Iranians took a shot at U.S. airbase in Al Udeid, about 25 miles west of Doha, but they inflicted little damage. Still, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar seemed to understand Iran’s capabilities and intent much better than Trump. As it became clear that another round of warfare was in the offing, the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states made it plain to Iran that they were not parties to whatever the Americans and Israelis were up to.
It didn’t matter. In the intervening months between the June 2025 war and Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, the Iranians developed a plan—hit their neighbors and threaten global energy supplies. Over the past five weeks, war has come home to the Gulf: The Emiratis have been hit more times than Israel, with the Iranians training their fire on energy infrastructure and the UAE tech sector; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has battered Bahrain’s energy and data centers; Kuwait’s oil facilities have taken hits; Qatar’s important Ras Laffan installation has been heavily damaged; and Saudi Arabia’s pipelines and refineries have been regular Iranian targets. All in all, the Iranians have fired thousands of missiles and drones at the GCC states.
The terms of the cease-fire and Iran’s 10-point peace plan—around which the administration claims to be negotiating—do not augur well for the Gulf states. In the Iranian foreign minister’s social media post announcing the agreement to a cease-fire, one line stuck out: “[S]afe passage through the Strait of Hormuz will be possible via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations.”
Despite Trump’s protestations that Tehran had agreed to freedom of navigation, it does not seem that Iran’s leaders will so easily relinquish their new leverage over the waterway. The second of Iran’s 10 points demands that Iran maintain control over the strait. A tolling system, which Trump seems open to exploring, would benefit the Iranian regime financially, making things worse for the Gulf states.
Before the war started on Feb. 28, Iran’s control or partial control over the strait was the realm of hypothetical and a casus belli. Now, that control exists. If Tehran succeeds in formalizing its position, the Gulf states will be either dependent on Iranian goodwill or be forced to hand over cash (or bitcoin) to a country that launched missiles and drones at them continually for five weeks.
Needless to say, Iran’s neighbors on the Western side of the Gulf will remain vulnerable to its missiles and drones. Even after the cease-fire was announced, the Iranians continued to fire (apparently because the Israelis continue to hit Lebanon). This threat explains why some leaders in the Gulf counseled Trump to finish the job. He did not, and as a consequence, the narrative about the Gulf being a good place do business and invest is compromised.
So now what?
The cease-fire is tenuous, so there is always the possibility that the United States would return to high intensity combat and weaken Iran’s position, which could solve the problems that the Gulf states now confront. But that seems unlikely. Trump seems intent on maintaining the fiction that regime change has taken place in Tehran and that the country’s new leaders are amendable to compromise.
That leaves leaders in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha with little choice but to deviate from their development plans and devote resources to hardening their cities and buying even more defense gear. They may even hedge a bit with Beijing like they did in the 2010s, when Americans declared that they were leaving the Middle East and pivoting to Asia. Gulf states leaned into economic ties with China, welcomed Chinese leaders to the region with great fanfare, and explored acquiring weapons from Beijing.
Whatever they do, it will take a long time for the Gulf states to recover from American recklessness.
